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tute / Humboldt University of Berlin
Federated Byzantine Agreement Systems (FBASs) are a fascinating new paradigm in the context of consensus protocols. Originally
proposed for powering the Stellar payment network, FBASs can be thought of as a middle way between typical permissionless systems
(like Bitcoin) and permissioned approaches for solving consensus (like classical BFT protocols). Unlike Bitcoin and the like, validators
must be explicitly chosen by peers. Unlike permissioned protocols, there is no need for the whole system to agree on the same set of
validators. Instead, every node is free to decide for itself with whom it requires agreement. In this paper, we propose an intuitive yet
precise methodology for determining whether the quorum systems resulting from such individual configurations can enable liveness
and safety, respectively how many (byzantine) node failures they are away from losing these qualities. We apply our analysis approach
and software to evaluate the effects of different node configuration policies, i.e., logics through which node configurations result from
strategic considerations or an existing inter-node relationship graph. Lastly, we also investigate the reported "open-membership"
property of FBASs. We observe that an often small group of nodes is exclusively relevant for determining safety and liveness "buffers",
and prove that these top tiers are effectively "closed-membership" if maintaining safety is a core requirement.
1 INTRODUCTION
We study Federated Byzantine Agreement Systems (FBASs), as originally proposed by Mazières [14] and subsequently
generalized by a range of other authors [3, 13]. While research on consensus protocols has accelerated in the wake
of global blockchain enthusiasm, developments still mostly fall in two extreme categories: permissionless, i.e., open-
membership, as exemplified by Bitcoin’s notoriously energy-hungry "Nakamoto consensus" [15], and permissioned, with
a closed-membership group of validators, as assumed both in the classical byzantine fault tolerance (BFT) literature
(e.g., [4]) and many state-of-the art protocols from the blockchain world (e.g., [18]). The FBAS paradigm suggests a
middle way: Each node defines its own rules about which groups of nodes it will consider as sufficient validators. If the
sum of all such configurations fulfills a set of properties, protocols like the Stellar Consensus Protocol (SCP) [14] can be
defined that leverage the resulting structure for establishing a live and safe consensus system [3, 12, 13, 20, 21]. Which
set of properties these are, how they result from specific configuration policies, and how they can be changed over time,
are the topics of this paper. Specifically, our contributions are:
• An intuitive yet precise framework for reasoning about safety and liveness guarantees in concrete FBAS instances.
• An exploration of possible configuration policies and their effects, via simulating their application and analyzing
the resulting FBASs.
• Towards understanding the reported "open membership" nature of FBASs, we formally prove that membership
in an FBAS’ top tier is only "open" if a violation of safety is considered acceptable.
As a companion to this publication, we furthermore release an extendable software framework for analyzing FBASs
and simulating the effects of configuration policies.
Authors’ address: Martin Florian, martin.florian@hu-berlin.de; Sebastian Henningsen, sebastian.henningsen@hu-berlin.de; Björn Scheuermann,
scheuermann@informatik.hu-berlin.de Weizenbaum Institute / Humboldt University of Berlin.
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2 RELATEDWORK
Federated Byzantine Agreements Systems were first proposed in [14], together with the Stellar Consensus Protocol (SCP), a
first protocol for this setting. The viability of SCP has been proven formally [12, 20, 21] and the protocol is in active use
in a large-scale payment network [12]. The FBAS notion has furthermore been generalized in different ways, enabling
the development of additional protocols and abstractions [3, 13]. In this work, we are less interested in the mechanics of
specific protocols for the FBAS setting but instead investigate the conditions they require for achieving safety, liveness
and performance. We investigate to what extend the conditions to safety and liveness are threatened in different FBAS
instances, and how individual node configuration policies influence global FBAS properties.
A heuristics-based methodology for analyzing specific FBAS instances was previously proposed in [10], focusing
on the identification of central nodes and threats to FBAS liveness. We propose a novel analysis approach that is not
heuristics-based and hence yields precise insights, based on a solid theoretic foundation. As in [10], we apply our
methodology to snapshots of the live Stellar network (cf. Appendix C). We furthermore apply our methodology to
synthetically generated FBAS resulting from the application of diverse node configuration policies.
Bracciali et al. [2] explore fundamental bounds on the decentrality in open quorum systems. One of their central
arguments with regards to the FBAS paradigm is that quorum intersection, a crucial requirement to guaranteeing
safety in protocols like SCP, is computationally intractable to determine and maintain, necessitating centralization
if safety is a requirement. The NP-hardness of determining quorum intersection was previously also proven in [11],
together, however, with practical algorithms for nevertheless tackling a wide range of interesting FBAS. Our own
analysis framework adapts and extends these algorithms, and through its application to FBASs of different sizes we
gain insights about the computational limitations that currently hold in practice. While, based on our analysis approach
and its application to specific FBASs, we can confirm that nodes of higher influence (top tier nodes according to our
choice of words) naturally emerge, we argue that it is not only the existence and size of such a group that determines
"centralization", but also the fluidity of that group’s membership (which we explicitly investigate).
An alternative analysis methodology and software framework, also using algorithms from [11], has recently been
presented in [9]. Among other things, the authors provide algorithms for determining the consequences of specific sets
of nodes becoming faulty, whereas we propose and implement approaches for identifying all minimal sets of nodes
that need to become faulty for an FBAS to lose safety and liveness guarantees. We were furthermore able to apply
our method to significantly larger FBASs, and notably also FBASs generated through simulating the effect of quorum
configuration policies.
The effects of quorum configuration on FBAS properties has also been studied in [19], however with a formal modeling
approach that was only tested in very small networks (n ≤ 5). Chitra et al. [5] explore under which circumstances the
selection of random validators is likely to result in an FBAS with quorum intersection, again using algorithms from [11].
We argue that the selection of random validators is neither Sybil-proof [6] nor sufficiently leveraging the individual
configuration freedom offered by the FBAS paradigm. With respect to the design of more intricate configuration
policies, we were so far able to discover mostly vague hints, such as that node operators should choose "large" sets of
"high-quality" validators [12]. We discuss different intuitive interpretations of the configuration options available to
node operators and propose specific configuration policies based on these interpretations. We evaluate defined policies
by simulating them to generate FBASs with hundreds of strongly connected nodes, and by analyzing the resulting
FBASs.
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3 FEDERATED BYZANTINE AGREEMENT
In the following, we introduce core concepts of the FBAS paradigm that form our basis for reasoning about specific
FBAS instances. We use terminology based on [12], [14], [11] and the Stellar codebase (stellar-core). We deliberately
choose this line of terminology over, say, [3], as it allows for an easier application of our results to the current Stellar
network and node software. We conjecture that our results are equally relevant for models such as [3].
Our FBAS model is based on the concept of nodes. Whereas nodes usually represent individual machines, for the
purposes of this paper, we typically assume that each node represents a distinct entity or organization. We will illustrate
introduced concepts using examples. For example: these are the nodes Alice, Bob and Carol: {a,b, c}. We will occasionally
also use established terms in the context of consensus protocols, such as "slot", "externalize" and "faulty", without
formally introducing them. As an informal and approximate adaptation to the blockchain setting, a slot is a block of a
given height, to externalize a value is to fill a block with contents, and a faulty node is one that violates protocol rules
in arbitrary ways, e.g., assuming the worst-case scenario, via being under the control of an attacker that also controls
all other faulty nodes.
3.1 Quorum set and FBAS
In an FBAS, each node (respectively its human administrator) individually configures which other nodes’ opinions it
should consider when participating in consensus. Configurations can express individual expectations, such as "out of
these n nodes, at most f will simultaneously cooperate to attack the system", and can be used to strategically influence
global system parameters. We delve significantly deeper into the semantics and "goodness" of node configuration in
Sec. 5, based on the conceptual frame developed in the following. On a conceptual level, the configuration of an FBAS
node consists in the definition of quorum slices.
Definition 1 (FBAS; adapted from [14]). A Federated Byzantine Agreement System (FBAS) is a pair (V,Q) comprising
a set of nodes V and a quorum function Q : V→ 22V specifying quorum slices for each node, where a node belongs to all of
its own quorum slices—i.e., ∀v ∈ V,∀q ∈ Q(v),v ∈ q.
Informally, each quorum slice of a node v describes a set of nodes that, should they all agree to externalize a value in
a given slot, this is sufficient to also cause v to externalize that value. While a useful abstraction for formally describing
FBASs and protocols for the FBAS setting, quorum slices are an unwieldy configuration format in practice. In Stellar,
the currently most relevant practical deployment of an FBAS, configuration therefore doesn’t happen via quorum slices
but via quorum sets [12]. Each quorum set defines a set of validator nodesU ⊆ V, a set of inner quorum sets I and a
threshold value t . Intuitively, this enables the encoding of notions such as "out of these |U | nodes, at least t must agree"
(satisfying the quorum set) and "the sum of agreeing nodes inU and satisfied inner quorum sets in I must be at least t".
Definition 2 (qorum set; adapted from Stellar codebase). The quorum set of a nodev ∈ V is a tuple (v,U ,I, t) ∈
D,D := V×2V × 2D × Z+. For quorum sets of the form D = (v,U ,I, t), we recursively define that a set of nodes q ⊆ V
satisfies D iff v ∈ q and (|q ∩U | + |{I ∈ I : q satisfies I }|) ≥ t . We denote the set of of quorum slices q ⊆ V that satisfy
(v,U ,I, t) as qset(v,U ,I, t)—i.e., qset(v,U ,I, t) : D→ 22V := {q ⊆ V,q satisfies (v,U ,I, t)}.
As hinted at by our qset notation, quorum sets and quorum slices can be transformed into one another. A straight-
forward (but generally not space-efficient) way to express the k arbitrary quorum slices {qi ∈ 2V | i ∈ [0,k),v ∈ qi }
of node v ∈ V as a quorum set is (v, ∅,I, 1), with I = {(v,qi , ∅, |qi |) | i ∈ [0,k)}. Quorum sets are translated back to
quorum slices (values of Q) by applying the qset function. For example (with V = {a,b, c}):
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• Q(a) = qset(a, {b, c}, ∅, 1) = {{a,b}, {a, c}, {a,b, c}}
• Q(b) = qset(b, {a, c}, ∅, 2) = {{a,b, c}}
• Q(c) = qset(c, {a,b, c}, ∅, 2) = {{a, c}, {b, c}, {a,b, c}}
In the above example, {a,b, c} and their quorum sets form an FBAS. Clearly, an FBAS cannot be modelled as a regular
graph (with FBAS nodes as graph edges) without losing information. Graph-based analyses as in [10] can therefore
result only in heuristic insights. An FBAS can be modelled as a directed hypergraph [8]. However, we find the quorum
set abstraction easier to work with. In Sec. 5 we investigate strategies for bootstrapping robust FBASs from graphs, e.g.,
based on graphs expressing existing trust relationships between nodes.
3.2 Will they agree on anything?
A group of FBAS nodes that can, based on their quorum sets, by-themself externalize new values is called a quorum.
Definition 3 (qorum [14]). A set of nodesU ⊆ V in FBAS (V,Q) is a quorum iffU , ∅ andU contains a quorum
slice for each member—i.e., ∀v ∈ U ∃q ∈ Q(v) : q ⊆ U .
This is equivalent to stating that U satisfies the quorum sets of all v ∈ U . Quorums are therefore determined by the
sum of all individual quorum set configurations. Continuing the previous example with nodes V = {a,b, c}, we get
the quorumsU = {{a,b, c}, {a, c}}. We say that (V,Q) has quorum availability despite faulty nodes iff there exists a
U ⊆ V that is a quorum in (V,Q) and consists of only non-faulty nodes. Quorum availability despite faulty nodes is a
necessary condition to achieving liveness in an FBAS, i.e., ensuring that non-faulty nodes can externalize new values
without the participation of any faulty nodes [14].
Theorem 3.1 (qorum availability⇐= liveness). If an FBAS (V,Q) enjoys liveness under some consensus protocol
that honours Q, (V,Q) enjoys quorum availability despite faulty nodes.
Proof. Let (V,Q) be an FBAS that enjoys liveness under some consensus protocol that honours Q. This implies that
a subset of nodesU ⊆ V has externalized a new value without the participation of faulty nodes. Since an agreement has
been reached, U , ∅. Let v ∈ U . Then, there exists a quorum slice q ∈ Q(v) with q ⊆ U , otherwise v would not have
agreed on the new value. Therefore,U is a quorum and (V,Q) enjoys quorum availability despite faulty nodes. □
Given quorum availability despite faulty nodes, protocols like SCP can ensure liveness [14]. In the case of SCP, this
was previously demonstrated through correctness proofs [21] as well as formal verification and practical deployment
experience [12]. Additional conditions to achieving liveness include the reaction (via quorum set adaptations, i.e.
changes to Q) to (detectable) timing attacks [12]. We defer to works such as [3, 13, 14] for an in-depth exploration of
the mechanics and guarantees of consensus protocols for the FBAS setting. In this paper, we implicitly assume that
such protocols are in use and "just work".
3.3 Will they agree on the same thing?
A set of nodes in an FBAS enjoy safety if no two of them ever externalize different values for the same slot [14]. In a
blockchain context, lack of safety can translate into the possibility of forks and double spends. Protocols such as SCP
ensure that, if all nodes are honest and no two quorums ever externalize conflicting values, no two nodes in the FBAS
will either. The situation that two quorums externalize different values is avoided by maintaining quorum intersection.
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Definition 4 (qorum intersection [14]). An FBAS enjoys quorum intersection iff any two of its quorums share a
node—i.e., for all quorumsU1 andU2,U1 ∩U2 , ∅.
For example, the set of quorums {{a,b, c}, {a, c}} intersects, whereas introducing an additional quorum {b,d} would
break quorum intersection. In the latter scenario, {a, c} and {b,d} could induce two new, separated FBASs [13]. In
a similar was as for liveness, we say that an FBAS enjoys quorum intersection despite faulty nodes iff every pair of
non-faulty quorums intersects in at least one non-faulty node. If quorum intersection despite faulty nodes is not given,
safety cannot be guaranteed (although it can be maintained by chance).
Theorem 3.2 (qorum intersection⇐= guarenteed safety). Let (V,Q) be an FBAS and P a consensus protocol
that can, honouring the respective Q, ensure liveness in any FBAS with quorum availability despite faulty nodes. If P can
guarantee safety for all non-faulty nodes in V, then (V,Q) enjoys quorum intersection despite faulty nodes.
Proof. Let (V,Q) and P according to the above definitions. Without loss of generality, we assume that V contains
only non-faulty nodes. If (V,Q) does not enjoy quorum intersection, then there are two quorum U1,U2 ⊂ V so that
U1 ∩U2 = ∅. For i ∈ {1, 2}, let Qi be defined such that ∀v ∈ Ui : Qi (v) := {q ∈ Q(v),q ⊆ Ui }. Then both (U1,Q1) and
(U2,Q2) form FBASs with quorum availability. As P guarantees liveness in any FBAS with quorum availability, and
especially in cases where U1 and U2 are separated due to connectivity issues, it is possible that (U1,Q1) and (U2,Q2)
independently externalize values for the same slots. These values can be different, which violates the safety property. □
There is strong evidence that protocols like SCP can guarantee safety in any FBAS with quorum intersection despite
faulty nodes [3, 12, 13, 21]. This seems to be the case even if faulty nodes lie about their quorum sets [20].
4 WHAT CANWE SAY ABOUT A GIVEN FBAS?
FBAS instances are complex structures isomorphic to hypergraphs (s. Sec. 3.1). How can node operators and users
determine whether a given FBAS is "sufficiently secure", or whether it is "centralized"? We break these questions down
into the more specific questions:
• Which groups of nodes can compromise liveness?
• Which groups of nodes can compromise safety?
• What is the composition of the "top tier"?
We will also discuss how the relevant properties can be determined in practice, introducing our software-based
analysis framework. An example (manual) application of our analysis method is given in Appendix B.1, while in
Appendix C we apply our analysis software to different snapshots of the Stellar network.
4.1 Minimal blocking sets
As per Thm. 3.1, an FBAS (V,Q) cannot enjoy liveness if it doesn’t contain at least one non-faulty quorum. Considering
the state of the art in consensus protocols for the FBAS setting and their formal verification (s.a. Sec. 3.2), quorum
availability despite faulty nodes is furthermore the only precondition to achieving liveness that depends on (V,Q)
and arguably the most difficult to satisfy in a practical deployment. However, while quorum availability can easily be
checked based on Q, faulty nodes are usually not readily identifiable as such in practice. We therefore propose, as a
means to grasping liveness risks, to look at sets of nodes that, if faulty, can undermine quorum availability.
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Definition 5 (blocking set). LetU ⊆ 2V be the set of all quorums of the FBAS (V,Q). We denote the set B ⊆ V as
blocking iff it intersects every quorum of the FBAS—i.e., ∀U ∈ U,B ∩U , ∅
For example: {a} and {c} are both blocking sets forU = {{a,b, c}, {a, c}}.
Corollary 1 (blocking sets and liveness). Control over any blocking set B is sufficient for compromising the liveness
of an FBAS (V,Q).
Proof. As B intersects all quorums of the FBAS, there is no quorum that can be formed without cooperation by B.
Without at least one intact quorum, liveness is not possible as per Thm. 3.1. □
Notably, blocking sets can also block liveness selectively, enabling censorship. As nodes from the blocking set are
present in every quorum, consensus will never be reached on any value that the blocking set opposes to. For example,
in the context of Stellar, the blocking set could block the ratification of transactions involving specific accounts. We
chose the term blocking in analogy to the v-blocking sets introduced in [14]. As an important distinction, we use the
term blocking set to refer to a property of the whole FBAS (V,Q), as opposed to a property of an individual node v ∈ V.
In the above example, {a} and {c} are not only blocking sets with respect toU = {{a,b, c}, {a, c}}, they are minimal
blocking sets, i.e., none of their proper subsets is a blocking set.
Definition 6 (minimal node set). Within the set of node sets N ⊆ 2V, a member set Nˆ ∈ N is minimal iff none of its
proper subsets is included in N—i.e., ∀N ∈ N ,N 1 Nˆ .
So, ifU = {{a,b, c}, {a, c}} are the quorums of an FBAS, Uˆ = {{a, c}} are its minimal quorums and Bˆ = {{a}, {c}}
are its minimal blocking sets. The notion of minimal quorums is helpful, among other things, for efficiently determining
whether an FBAS enjoys quorum intersection [11]: it can be shown that an FBAS enjoys quorum intersection iff every
two of its minimal quorums intersect. Similarly, a set that is blocking for all minimal quorums is blocking for all quorums
in general, and the set of all minimal blocking sets of an FBAS equals the set of all minimal blocking sets for the minimal
quorums of that FBAS. We defer the formal write-up of these corollaries (and their proofs) to Appendix A.
4.2 Minimal splitting sets
As per Thm. 3.2, an FBAS can only be considered safe (as one coherent system) as long as it enjoys quorum intersection
despite faulty nodes, i.e., as long as each pair of its quorums intersect in at least one non-faulty node. In the face of
state of the art protocols like SCP and the correctness proofs surrounding them (s.a. Sec. 3.3), we furthermore argue
that, for practical purposes, quorum intersection despite faulty nodes is a sufficient condition for achieving safety in an
FBAS. Hence, for assessing the risk to safety, it is interesting to identify sets of nodes that comprise intersections of
pairs of quorums. We call a set of nodes that contains intersections of one or more quorum pairs a splitting set, as it can,
if malicious, cause at least two quorum to diverge, splitting the FBAS.
Definition 7 (splitting set). LetU ⊆ 2V be the set of all quorums of the FBAS (V,Q). We denote the set S ⊆ V a
splitting set iff it contains an intersection of at least two quorums of the FBAS—i.e., there are distinct quorums U1 andU2 so
thatU1 ∩U2 ⊆ S .
The existence of a faulty splitting set clearly violates quorum intersection despite faulty nodes and therefore, as per
Thm. 3.2, threatens safety. Informally, a splitting set can conspire to agree to different statements in two quorums it is
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"splitting", causing the quorums to externalize conflicting values and in this way diverge. As with blocking sets, we are
especially interested in finding the minimal splitting sets Sˆ ⊂ 2V of an FBAS (V,Q).
Similarly as with minimal blocking sets, it is sufficient to consider only minimal quorums when searching for minimal
splitting sets. An intersection of two non-minimal quorums is either a non-minimal splitting set of the FBAS or identical
to at least one intersection of two minimal quorums (we prove these and related corollaries in Appendix A).
4.3 Top tier
For narrowing down notions of "centralization" with respect to FBASs, we propose the concept of a top tier. Informally,
the top tier is the set of nodes in the FBAS that is exclusively relevant when determining minimal blocking sets and
minimal splitting sets, and hence the liveness and safety "buffers" of an FBAS.
Definition 8 (top tier). We define the top tier of an FBAS (V,Q) as the set of all nodes contained in one or more
minimal quorums—i.e., if Uˆ ⊆ 2V is the set of all minimal quorums of the FBAS, T = ⋃ Uˆ is its top tier.
Based on this definition, it can be shown that each minimal blocking set consists exclusively of top tier nodes,
and each top tier node is included in at least one minimal blocking set. Similarly, each minimal splitting set consists
exclusively of top tier nodes. We prove these statements in Appendix A.
Larger top tier sizes are likely to become a significant performance factor. While we are not aware of any published
studies on the performance of SCP (the so far only production-ready protocol for the FBAS setting, to the best of our
knowledge), we argue that SCP is similar to Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) [4] with regards to message
complexity—it can be shown to require no less than O(m2) messages per agreement round for a smallest quorum
of sizem. While PBFT-related consensus protocols are notorious for becoming unusable in larger validator groups,
several improved protocols have recently emerged that target the blockchain use case and scenarios with 100 and
more validators [17, 18]. While an application of proposed improvements to the FBAS paradigm is conceivable, specific
proposals towards this goal are not known to us at this time. As a possible avenue for future exploration—for FBASs
with a symmetric top tier, existing permissioned protocols could be adapted without much modification.
Definition 9 (symmetric top tier). The top tier T of an FBAS (V,Q) is a symmetric top tier iff all top tier nodes have
identical quorum sets—i.e., ∀v1,v2 ∈ T : Q(v1) = Q(v2).
As we work out in detail in Appendix A, in FBASs with a symmetric top tier T and a (for simplicity) non-nested top
tier quorum set (v,T , ∅, t), it holds that any minimal blocking set has cardinality |Bˆ | = |T | − t + 1 and any minimal
splitting set has cardinality |Sˆ | = 2t − |T |.
4.4 Determining properties in practice
As noted in other works (e.g., [2, 11]), determining core FBAS properties like quorum intersection quickly leads to tasks
of exponential computational complexity. Nevertheless, previous works [11] also provide heuristics and algorithms
for effectively determining properties like quorum intersection for non-trivial FBASs such as the Stellar network. We
extend the related work on analyzing specific FBAS instances in the following ways:
(1) We develop algorithms for newly proposed analyses, such as the listing of all minimal blocking and minimal
splitting sets and the identification of a top tier.
(2) We propose algorithms for efficiently dealing with edge-case FBASs, such as large FBASs that are suspected of
not enjoying quorum intersection and FBASs with a symmetric top tier.
8 Martin Florian, Sebastian Henningsen, and Björn Scheuermann
(3) We contribute a simulation component enabling us to generate and study significantly larger numbers of
interesting FBASs than previous works, which also provides insights into which FBAS structures and sizes are
amenable to analysis.
(4) We implement all proposed analyses and simulation mechanics in the form of an extendable software framework
that we release as open source.
We give a very rough overview on (1) and (2) in the following. We will discuss (3) and our experiences with regards
to analysis scalability in the upcoming Sec. 5. For more information on (4) and details exceeding what is presented here,
we defer to our (documented) implementation1.
4.4.1 Minimal sets. We find minimal quorums using an adaptation of the algorithm proposed in [11]. Most importantly,
we implement an additional filtering step to ensure that no non-minimal sets are returned. We then determine minimal
blocking sets using a novel branch-and-bound algorithm with similar structure as the algorithm for listing minimal
quorums. We find minimal splitting sets by first gathering all pair-wise intersections of minimal quorums and then
filtering out the non-minimal ones. We apply different heuristics and optimizations throughout all analysis steps. We
conjecture that for an FBAS with n = |V | nodes and a top tier of sizem = |T | our implementation finds all k ≤ ( m⌈m2 ⌉)
minimal quorums in O(2m ) (average case) to O(2n ) (worst case) and, once the minimal quorums are found, all minimal
blocking sets in O(2m ) and all minimal splitting sets in O(k2). In practice and for larger FBASs, we observe that the
listing of minimal quorums often completes significantly faster than the remaining analyses.
4.4.2 Alternative quorum intersection check. Our regular approach, adapted from [11], for validating whether an FBAS
enjoys quorum intersection is based on finding all k ≤ ( m⌈m2 ⌉) minimal quorums and subsequently checking if each
two of them intersect. For larger top tier sizesm, it takes prohibitive amounts of time to discover all minimal quorums.
We therefore propose and implement a complementary alternative algorithm that is slower for FBASs with quorum
intersection but potentially significantly faster for FBASs that lack quorum intersection. Our proposed algorithm follows
the same branch-and-bound strategy and branch pruning logic used for finding minimal quorums. However, once
a potentially minimal quorum U ⊂ V is found, instead of storing U , it is checked whether U c = V \U contains any
quorums. This check can be completed in O(|U c |3) by recursively removing all unsatisfiable nodes until no more nodes
can be removed, arriving at aU c ′ ⊆ U c . IfU c ′ contains nodes (soU c ′ , ∅),U c ′ is a quorum. SinceU is also a quorum
and U ∩U c ′ = ∅, we have shown that the FBAS does not enjoy quorum intersection and can terminate the search.
The original quorum listing logic is guaranteed to list all minimal quorums, so if all branches of the search terminate
without uncovering two non-intersecting quorums, the FBAS can safely be assumed to enjoy quorum intersection. In
Sec. 5.3, we use this algorithm to prove, within seconds, that a specific large FBAS doesn’t enjoy quorum intersection.
For comparison, our regular quorum intersection check didn’t complete at all for the same FBAS (we terminated the
analysis after several days of computation).
4.4.3 Symmetric top tiers. We also implemented a fast detector for symmetric clusters, i.e., sets of nodes in which each
two nodes have the same quorum set. An FBAS that enjoys quorum intersection and has a symmetric top tier (Def. 9)
contains exactly one symmetric cluster - its top tier. Our detection algorithm groups all nodes in V by quorum set. If a
group of nodes N is thus found so that ∀v ∈ N : ⋃Q(v) = N , the quorum set corresponding to N is returned (as a
representation of this symmetric cluster), allowing subsequent manual analysis. For ensuring that the FBAS enjoys
quorum intersection, the unsatisfiability of the complement set V \N is verified similarly as in Sec. 4.4.2.
1 https://github.com/wiberlin/fbas_analyzer
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5 HOW SHOULD I CONFIGURE MY FBAS NODE?
The reported openness enabled through the FBAS paradigm comes at the cost of increased configuration responsibilities
for node operators. As discussed in Sec. 3, each node must become associated with a quorum set (and thereby quorum
slices) for becoming a useful part of an FBAS. We will refer to this process as quorum set configuration (QSC). But how
should a node operator go about QSC? Based on the analytical toolset introduced in Sec. 4, we can now investigate
what kinds of QSC policies are plausible and in what kind of FBASs they result.
5.1 QSC policies and their evaluation
A QSC policy is individually and repeatedly invoked for each node v ∈ V. It takes information about a current FBAS
instance (V,Q) as input and returns a quorum set for v , setting a new value for Q(v). Without loss of generality, we will
discuss QSC policies resulting in non-nested quorum sets, i.e., quorum sets of the form (v,U , ∅, t) (for a set of validators
U ⊆ V and a threshold t ). Such QSC policies must output two values:
(1) A set of validators U ⊆ V
(2) A quorum set threshold t ∈ Z+
5.1.1 Choosing validators. What does a given choice ofU actually mean? We argue that this depends on semantics and
distinguish two interpretations of "QSC" that can shape the choice ofU : as an outlet for strategic considerations towards
optimizing FBAS-wide properties, and as a tool for expressing individual preferences. Each of these interpretations
implies a different set of QSC policies, examples for which we will discuss starting from Sec. 5.2.
5.1.2 Choosing thresholds. We argue that t , unlike U , can be chosen in a way that is compatible with both strategic
and individualistic QSC. Looking into the current practice, for v ∈ U belonging to distinct organizations, the Stellar
software (stellar-core) sets t to either 67 % or 100 % of |U | [12]. Lower values of t are deemed unsafe by stellar-core.
And for good reason, as, for example, a t ≤ |U |2 severely threatens quorum intersection. 67 % thresholds correspond
to a well-established equilibrium for byzantine-fault tolerant systems. For non-nested quorum sets, they are actually
calculated in stellar-core as t = ⌈ 2 |U |+13 ⌉2, which maximizes f in the equation |U | ≥ 3f + 1. This threshold calculation
rule enables symmetric top tiers T with |T | = 3f + 1 members to arrive at an equilibrium common to protocols such
as PBFT [4]—both safety and liveness can be maintained in the face up to f node failures. 100 % thresholds, finally,
tilt the scales maximally towards safety, at the total expense of liveness. When t = |U |, only one node inU needs to
fail to prevent the satisfaction of the quorum set. Unless noted otherwise, we will always use 67 % thresholds in the
subsequent discussion. This enables strategic node operators to achieve configurations with the same guarantees as
classical BFT protocols. At the same time, it is also a completely plausible choice for individualistic policies—even more
so since it corresponds to a current software default. Notably, using the same rule for calculating t across all discussed
policies also improves the comparability of results.
5.1.3 Simulation and measurement. Our FBAS analysis tool includes a simulation component. We simulate the process
in which the quorum set of each node is (re-)configured, based on specific QSC policies that we discuss in the remainder
of this section. The simulation component produces an FBAS representation in JSON format that gets passed to the
analysis component introduced in Sec. 4.4. The analysis component extracts quantitative data about the resulting FBAS.
Namely, we determine their:
2 For nested quorum sets, the formula becomes t = ⌈ 2(|U |+|I |)+13 ⌉.
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• Liveness "buffer", based on the cardinalities of minimal blocking sets (cf. Sec. 4.1).
• Safety "buffer", based on the cardinalities of all minimal splitting sets (cf. Sec. 4.2).
• Top tier size (cf. Sec. 4.3), with its various implications—FBASs with small top tiers are more efficient and more
amenable to analysis, however a small top tier also implies centralization.
We present analysis results using bar plots. Bar heights express the cardinality of the top tier and the average cardinalities
of minimal blocking and minimal splitting sets. Error bars mark minima and maxima, i.e., the cardinalities of the
smallest and largest minimal blocking and minimal splitting sets.
5.1.4 Modelling individual preferences. In QSC policies based on individual preferences, nodes should contribute local
knowledge to the collective FBAS configuration. This can include local views such as:
• Which nodes are trusted to be honest and high-quality (i.e., not faulty).
• Which nodes are believed to be non-sybil (i.e., not controlled by the same organization).
• Which nodes usually interact with the local node.
It is often implied that QSC should reflect some form of trust, e.g., in wordings such as "flexible trust" [14] or "asymmetric
distributed trust" [3]. Reasoning about the future behaviour of nodes in the context of a consensus protocol might
be an overwhelming task for node operators, however. Encoding beliefs about non-sybilness [6], e.g., by grouping
nodes believed to belong to the same entity or organization in inner quorum sets, might be easier in comparison. For
individual nodes, quorum intersection is especially relevant with respect to the group of nodes they most frequently
interact with, lest they end up with, e.g., diverging ledgers in the event of a fork. Adding nodes of organizations one
interacts with to one’s own quorum sets appears to be a prudent strategy for staying "in sync" with them [12].
In the following discussion, we will use graph representations for getting a grip on the fuzzy notion of "preferences".
It is an intriguing hypothesis that the FBAS paradigm might be used for realizing sybil-resistant and yet energy-
efficient permissionless consensus by bootstrapping the quorum structure along an existing trust graph, social graph
or interaction graph. In Sec. 3.1 we saw that transforming an FBAS to an equally sized graph must, in general, lose
information, i.e. can yield only heuristic representations. In Sec. 5.3 and Sec. 5.4 we pose the inverse question: How can
a "good" FBAS (V,Q) be instantiated from a given graph G = (V,E)?
We can evaluate graph-based policies using real-world graph data as well as synthetic graphs. In the following
sections we will present results based on two snapshots of the autonomous system (AS) relationships graph inferred
by the CAIDA project3. The topological structure of the Internet has repeatedly been cited as an argument for the
viability of the FBAS model [12, 14]. The two snapshots we chose are from January 1998—the earliest available snapshot
describing a younger Internet with 3233 ASs connected via 4921 (directed) customer/provider links and 852 (undirected)
peering links—and from January 2020—with 67308 ASs connected via 133864 customer/provider links and 312763
peering links. We will refer to the graphs as GAS98 and GAS20.
Our simulation tool also supports the generation of synthetic graphs, using established approaches such as the
Barabási–Albert [1] model for generating scale-free graphs. However, our experiments so far did not result in a
theoretically founded graph generation approach that consistently produces suitable graphs. Top tiers emerging from
synthetic graphs were often vastly big or not sufficiently intraconnected to result in FBASs that are simultaneously
safe, interesting and feasible to analyze. In the interest of space, we will therefore focus exclusively on our experiments
involving the AS graph.
3 The CAIDA AS Relationships Dataset, 1998-01-01 (serial-1) and 2020-01-01 (serial-2), https://www.caida.org/data/as-relationships/
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5.2 Strategic QSC
Strategic considerations implies that node operators are interested in maintaining and improving measurable global
FBAS properties. QSC policies that see achieving quorum intersection as the main goal of QSC (like [5] and the QSC
sketch in [11]) fall in this category. A straightforward strategy for tweaking properties like safety, liveness and top tier
size is to mimic a permissioned system with an appropriately defined top tier. For example, for maximizing safety and
liveness "buffers", we can set the top tier to V, the set of all nodes in the FBAS:
∀v ∈ V : Q(v) = qset(v,V, ∅, ⌈2|V| + 13 ⌉) (Ideal Open QSC)
As a consequence of the previous discussion on FBASs with a symmetric top tier (cf. Sec. 4.3 and Thm. A.2), for
|V | = 3f + 1 the application of Ideal Open QSC results in FBASs with the same safety and liveness guarantees as
classical BFT systems (i.e., both all minimal blocking sets and all minimal splitting sets have size f + 1). We must,
however, assume that all nodes v ∈ V in the FBAS (V,Q) are at least non-sybil. Ensuring the non-sybilness of nodes
is notoriously difficult in open systems without universally trusted authorities [6]. For circumventing this challenge,
strategic node operators might choose to limit openness by agreeing on a top tier T ⊂ V beforehand. Assuming that all
v ∈ V submit to the same choice of T :
∀v ∈ V : Q(v) = qset(v,T , ∅, ⌈2|T | + 13 ⌉) (Ideal Permissioned QSC)
We must sidestep the question of how the preselected top tier T ⊂ V should be, in the end, selected. If governance
mechanisms are in place that facilitate a convergence on T (e.g., through "real-world" negotiation or some ingenious
ranking protocol), there is arguably no need for applying the FBAS paradigm and involving the complexities of FBAS
protocols. The existence of a well defined set of validator nodes (like T ) is a sufficient condition for being able to use
efficient "permissioned" consensus protocols like [18].
Interestingly, an unambiguous top tierT ⊂ V can also emerge organically in networks that grow iteratively, i.e., node
by node. Consider something as simple as random validator selection with a fixed target number of validators |U | =m:
∀v ∈ V : U = {min(m, |V|) random nodes from V}, Q(v) = qset(v,U , ∅, ⌈2|U | + 13 ⌉) (Random QSC)
If QSC is performed based on the current network state and never repeated once a node’s quorum set has become
"large enough" (i.e., |U | =m), the firstm nodes to join the network consistently become the top tierT . They furthermore
form a symmetric top tier (Def. 9), as they all stop adapting their quorum sets once exactlym nodes have joined. Since
every new node using this policy includes older nodes into its quorum set, no new minimal quorums can emerge. We
validate this effect empirically using simulations. Fig. 1 depicts obtained results form = 6 andm = 7 (inspired by
current values in the Stellar network) and arbitrary large n = |V|. Bar heights express the cardinality of the top tier and
the average cardinalities of minimal blocking and minimal splitting sets. The empirical results match the analytical
expectation for FBASs with symmetric top tiers (cf. Sec. 4.3 and Thm. A.2). Among other things, top tier sizes of the
formm = 3f + 1 induce equally sized safety and liveness "buffers", while in other cases safety profits earlier than
liveness from increases in top tier size.
Random validator selection has also been proposed in [5], however it was not evaluated with the temporal component
of "choosing only from nodes that have joined before". Random validator selection is not sybil-proof as nodes are picked
from all v ∈ V (an open set without admission control). However, if one can assume that the firstm nodes to join the
network are non-sybil, the potential damage from sybil nodes joining later in time is limited.
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(a)m = 6, any n ≥ 6
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(b)m = 7, any n ≥ 7
Fig. 1. Random QSC when FBAS grows incrementally and nodes do not adapt their configuration upon reaching the desired |U | =m.
5.3 Individualistic QSC
We consider a QSC policy individualistic if it is based on individual preferences, i.e., in our model (cf. Sec. 5.1.4), on edges
in a preexisting relationship graphG = (V,E). As a simple representative of this class, we propose to instantiate quorum
sets directly from neighborhoods inG , incorporating the notion that only nodes with whom a direct relationship exists
are worthy of inclusion in a quorum set:
∀v ∈ V : U = {v} ∪ {v ′ ∈ V : (v,v ′) ∈ E}, Q(v) = qset(v,U , ∅, ⌈2|U | + 13 ⌉) (All Neighbors QSC)
IfG is not connected, we can’t have quorum intersection (and hence safety). IfG is a complete graph, we furthermore
get the same result as with Ideal Open QSC. We applied this policy to the two AS graph snapshotsGAS98 andGAS20. The
resulting FBASs could not, for the most part, be analyzed within a reasonable time frame. Using our alternative quorum
intersection check algorithm (cf. Sec. 4.4.2), we were able to determine that the FBAS instantiated from GAS20 lacks
quorum intersection. The high prevalence of AS peering in today’s Internet is a likely explanation for why sufficiently
well intraconnected clusters can emerge outside of the "natural" top tier for that graph.
5.4 Mixed QSC policies
Strategic QSC requires out-of-band coordination for sybil resistance while individualistic QSC results in FBASs that are
hard to analyze and easily turn out unsafe. How can individualistic policies (the possibility for which is arguably the
key selling point for the FBAS paradigm) be adapted towards strategically better outcomes?
5.4.1 Tier-based QSC. We observe that nodes can be distinguished by tierness, or relative centrality in the graph.
Tierness is an established notion for ASs in the Internet graph. For FBASs, a tiered quorum structure with every node
including only higher-tier neighbors in its quorum sets was proposed as early as in the original FBAS proposal [14].
We conjecture that if nodes include only their higher-tier neighbors in quorum sets and the highest-tier nodes are
reasonably well interconnected4, we are likely to end up in an FBAS with quorum intersection. Picking nodes based on
their tierness is also related to the quality-based configuration format currently used by the Stellar software [12].
In the following, we make the additional assumption that nodes can infer the relative tierness of their graph
neighbors, i.e, that they can, with reasonable room for error, determine which of their neighbors are of a higher tier
than themselves. For our simulation-based exploration of this policy class, we use the PageRank [16] score of nodes
(calculated without dampening) as a proxy for their tierness. With rank_score(v) denoting the PageRank score of node
v and edges+(v) := {v ′ ∈ V : (v,v ′) ∈ E}, each simulated node determines its higher-tier neighbors H and same-tier
4 Notably, this is not always the case in synthetic scale-free graphs generated using the Barabási-Albert model.
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neighbors ("peers") P as follows:
H (v) = {v ′ ∈ edges+(v) : rank_score(v ′) ≥ 2 rank_score(v)}
P(v) = {v ′ ∈ edges+(v) : 12 rank_score(v) < rank_score(v
′) < 2 rank_score(v)}
(Tierness Heuristics)
We can then formulate following QSC policy:
∀v ∈ V : U =

{v} ∪ H (v) if H (v) , ∅
{v} ∪ P(v) else
, Q(v) = qset(v,U , ∅, ⌈2|U | + 13 ⌉) (Higher-Tier Neighbors QSC)
|min. block. set| |min. split. set| |top tier|
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|min. block. set| |min. split. set| |top tier|
0
10
20
30
(b) GAS20 (theoretic bounds for some results)
Fig. 2. Higher-Tier Neighbors QSC (from AS relationships graph snapshots).
The results of applying this policy to the AS graph snapshots GAS98 and GAS20 are depicted in Fig. 2. Like in the rest
of this paper, bar heights express (average) cardinalities. For GAS98, error bars mark the cardinalities of the respectively
smallest and largest minimal blocking and minimal splitting sets. The FBAS resulting fromGAS20 was not amenable
to deeper analysis—in the time available for this experiment (around 7 days), our analysis software could precisely
determine only the minimal quorums and, consequently, top tier of the FBAS (after around 30 minutes). The plotted
error bars represent lower and upper bounds calculated based on the found minimal quorums. Note that the FBAS
enjoys quorum intersection. Concerning the FBAS bootstrapped from GAS98, it is noteworthy that at a top tier size
of 15, minimal blocking sets have an average cardinality of only 3.3, with the smallest ones having cardinality 2.
For comparison, a symmetric top tier T with |T | = 15 would result in all minimal blocking sets having size 5. This
liveness-threatening discrepancy can be explained through cascading failures: If (for example) two nodes fail, this can
result in a third node with a "weak" quorum set becoming unsatisfiable, so that three nodes have now de-facto failed,
which can result in a fourth node becoming unsatisfiable, et cetera. We very frequently see the same cascading effects
when instantiating FBASs from synthetically generated scale-free and small-world graphs. It seems that the composition
and size of smallest blocking sets for an FBAS is heavily influenced by the "weakest" quorum sets in the FBAS’ top tier.
An additional example for cascading failures is given Appendix B.2.
5.4.2 Tier-based QSC with symmetry-enforcing top tier. The graph-based QSC policies discussed so far frequently result
in systems that are brittle (in the sense of small minimal blocking sets) and hard to analyze. Both of these characteristics
are vastly improved, relative to top tier size, in FBASs with symmetric top tiers. However, symmetric top tiers emerge
organically from a preexisting relationship graphG only if the top tier nodes (selected, e.g., based on Tierness Heuristics)
form a complete subgraph of G, which is not the case in the graphs investigated so far.
In the following, we propose a mixture between the mainly individualistic policy Higher-Tier Neighbors QSC and a
strategic element aiming at creating symmetry in the top tier. Namely, we propose a policy in which nodes believing
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themselves to be top tiermirror the quorum sets of other apparently top tier nodes, strategically including non-neighbors
in their quorum sets for improving the global FBAS structure:
∀v ∈ V :U =

{v} ∪ H (v) if H (v) , ∅
{v} ∪ P(v) else
, U ′ = U ∪
⋃
{
⋃
Q(v ′), v ′ ∈ U ∧v ∈
⋃
Q(v ′)}
Q(v) = qset(v,U ′, ∅, ⌈2|U
′ | + 1
3 ⌉)
(Symmetry-Enforcing Higher-Tier Neighbors QSC)
Like in Higher-Tier Neighbors QSC, nodes choose their validators U based on connections in G and Tierness
Heuristics. Newly, each node v extends its thus chosen validatorsU by all validators that potential top tier nodes inU
have currently configured. A nodev ′ is considered a potential top tier node if it includesv as a validator, orv ∈ ⋃Q(v ′).
Since v ′ ∈ ⋃Q(v) (otherwise v ′ < U ), v ∈ ⋃Q(v ′) can only happen if H (v ′) = ∅, i.e., v ′ acts on the assumption that it
is a top tier node. After several rounds of QSC, and if G is sufficiently well connected, the FBAS converges to a top tier
T with ∀v1,v2 ∈ T : Q(v1) = Q(v2).
|min. block. set| |min. split. set| |top tier|
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|min. block. set| |min. split. set| |top tier|
0
10
20
30
(b) GAS20
Fig. 3. Symmetry-Enforcing Higher-Tier Neighbors QSC (from AS relationships graph snapshots).
As can be observed from our analysis results in Fig. 3, this is in fact the case when instantiating from the AS graph
snapshots GAS98 and GAS20. In the case ofGAS98, we see that by enforcing symmetrical top tiers with an appropriate
common quorum set threshold, minimal blocking set sizes (and thus the FBASs’ "liveness buffer") can be significantly
increased. By employing our algorithm for symmetric cluster detection (cf. Sec. 5.4.2), we were furthermore able to
complete all analyses in seconds, even for the GAS20-bootstrapped FBAS with a top tier of size 36.
Of course, by making validator decisions independent of the local knowledge representation G, we need new
assumptions to be able to assume a resistance to sybil attacks. If nodes implement a policy like Symmetry-Enforcing
Higher-Tier Neighbors QSC to the letter, any top tier node can introduce arbitrary numbers of sybil nodes into the top
tier. This kind of strategy is therefore only sensical if it can be assumed that nodes in T can detect such attempts. While
both the set of required "vigilant operators" and the set of potential "attackers" (that such operators need to be vigilant
about) is reduced by converging to a top tier T ⊂ V, the requirement for vigilance and the potential manual verification
of quorum set changes is still present. Given the lack of explicit incentives for running validator nodes in systems like
Stellar, such a burden on the operators of top tier nodes might be viewed as problematic [10]. However, similar critique
can also be voiced against systems (like Bitcoin) that base their security arguments on notions of economic rationality,
as economic rationality can also be leveraged by attackers [7].
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6 OPENNESS AND TOP TIER FLUIDITY
The FBAS paradigm reportedly enables the instantiation of consensus systems with open membership [12, 14]. And
clearly, arbitrary nodes can join an FBAS, causing new quorums to be formed that contain them. Based on the preceding
discussion, however, we recognize that without creating a new, de-facto disjoint FBAS, or the active reconfiguration of
existing nodes, new nodes cannot become part of minimal quorums, and hence minimal blocking sets and minimal
splitting sets. In other words, their existence is irrelevant as far as the so far discussed safety and liveness indicators
are concerned. In Sec. 4 we defined the notion of a top tier to reflect the set of nodes in an FBAS that is not irrelevant
for safety and liveness, i.e., the set of nodes from which minimal quorums, blocking sets and splitting sets are formed.
The top tier wields absolute power to censor and block the whole FBAS, and malicious subsets of the top tier are both
indispensable and sufficient for causing forks and double spends.
In the following, we investigate the question to what extend this top tier can be considered a group with open
membership. How can its power be diluted, by promoting additional nodes to top tier status? Can nodes be "fired"
from the top tier? We make the case that, in general, a top tier T can neither grow nor shrink without either the active
involvement of existing top tier nodes or a loss of safety guarantees. We base all subsequent projections on the status
quo of an FBAS that enjoys quorum intersection despite faulty nodes (a safe FBAS as per the discussion in Sec. 3.3).
6.1 Top-down top tier change
As a preliminary remark, recall that, as per Def. 8, we define the top tier T of an FBAS (V,Q) as the union of all its
minimal quorums. T is therefore also a quorum and intersects every quorum in (V,Q).
Theorem 6.1 (top tier can safely change itself). Let T ⊂ V be the top tier of an FBAS (V,Q) that enjoys quorum
availability and quorum intersection. Then it is possible, without compromising neither quorum availability nor quorum
intersection, to instantiate a new top tier T ′ ⊆ V,T ′ , ∅ by changing only the quorum sets of new and old top tier nodes
v ∈ T ∪T ′.
Proof. Let T ′ ⊆ V,T ′ , ∅ be the goal top tier. Let Q′ be a modification of Q so that ∀v ∈ T ∪T ′ : Q′(v) = T ′5 and
∀v < T ∪T ′ : Q′(v) = Q(v). As T ′ is a quorum w.r.t. Q′, (T ′,Q′) enjoys quorum availability. Therefore, (V,Q′) enjoys
quorum availability. (V \T ′,Q′) does not enjoy quorum availability, because no node in T in satisfied without T ′ and
no node in V \T can form a quorum without a node from T (otherwise T would no have been the top tier w.r.t. Q, cf.
Def. 8). There are therefore no quorums w.r.t. Q′ that are disjoint of T ′. (V,Q′) therefore enjoys quorum intersection iff
(T ′,Q′) enjoys quorum intersection, which it (trivially) does. □
The situation is less clear if some nodes T \T ′ do not wish to leave T . Note, however, that single nodes can always
endanger safety via trivial configurations such as Q(v) = {{v}}. If performed by one or more nodes in T , such an act of
sabotage can easily have an impact on the safety of large portions of the FBAS.
6.2 Bottom-up top tier change
In the following, we assume a "self-centered" top tier in the sense that all top tier nodes include only other top tier
nodes in quorum sets. Symmetric top tiers (Def. 9) have this property, as do top tiers observed in the wild in the Stellar
network (cf. Appendix C).
5 Without loss of generality. Clearly, more robust top tier constructions are possible.
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Theorem 6.2 (no safe top tier change with uncooperative top tier). Let (V,Q) be an FBAS that enjoys quorum
intersection and has a "self-centered" top tier T ⊂ V such that all top tier quorum slices are comprised of only top tier nodes
(∀v ∈ V : ⋃Q(v) ⊆ T ). Then it is not possible, without compromising quorum intersection, to instantiate a new top tier
T ′ ⊆ V,T ′ , T by changing only the quorum sets of non-top tier nodes v ∈ V \T .
Proof. Let T ′ ⊆ V,T ′ , T be the top tier of a new FBAS (V,Q′) that enjoys quorum intersection. Let Uˆ and Uˆ ′ be
the sets of all minimal quorums of (V,Q) and (V,Q′), respectively. As per Def. 8, T ′ , T implies that Uˆ , Uˆ ′.
Assume there exists a Uˆ ∈ Uˆ \ Uˆ ′. Then Uˆ is a quorum w.r.t. Q and either (a) not a quorum w.r.t. Q′ or (b) not
minimal w.r.t. Q′. However, we require that the quorum sets of top tier nodes don’t change: ∀v ∈ T : Q′(v) = Q(v).
Therefore Uˆ is a quorum also w.r.t. Q′, contradicting (a). Hence, (b) must hold and there must be a Uˆ ′ ∈ Uˆ ′ such that
Uˆ ′ ⊂ Uˆ (cf. Def. 6). As Uˆ ′ ⊆ Uˆ ⊆ T , Uˆ ′ being a quorum w.r.t. Q′ implies it also being a quorum w.r.t. Q. But then Uˆ is
not minimal w.r.t. Q, implying Uˆ < Uˆ and thus again leading to a contradiction. This proves that Uˆ ⊆ Uˆ ′.
Assume now there exists a Uˆ ′ ∈ Uˆ ′ \ Uˆ and let Uˆ ∈ Uˆ. As (V,Q′) enjoys quorum intersection, Uˆ ′ ∩ Uˆ , ∅ and Uˆ ′
contains members of the "old" top tierT . Uˆ ′ is a quorum w.r.t. Q′, but Uˆ ′ ∩T cannot be a quorum w.r.t. Q′ as otherwise
Uˆ ′ would not be a minimal quorum. There must therefore exist a node v ∈ Uˆ ′ ∩T with a quorum slice q ∈ Q′(v) such
that (Uˆ ′ ∩T ) ⊂ q ⊆ Uˆ ′ (cf. Def. 3), i.e., q \T , ∅. As v ∈ T , we require that Q′(v) = Q(v) and⋃Q(v) ⊆ T , which leads
to a contradiction since q ∈ Q(v) and q \T , ∅. It must therefore hold that Uˆ \ Uˆ ′ = ∅, Uˆ = Uˆ ′ and T = T ′. □
6.3 Consequences
Who determines which FBAS nodes get to form the top tier? Our results imply that, if maintaining safety is seen as an
untouchable requirement, the top tier Ti of an FBAS (Vi ,Qi ) at "iteration" i is legitimated by decisions of, exclusively,
members of Ti−1 ∪Ti (if none of them cooperates, we lose safety, if all of them cooperate, we don’t). Because of the top
tier’s determining importance to the safety, liveness and performance achievable within a given FBAS, open membership
in Vi if of little benefit without open membership in Ti .
How closed is the membership in Ti? It might be sufficient that only some nodes in Ti−1 support a transition to Ti .
If reactive QSC policies like Symmetry-Enforcing Higher-Tier Neighbors QSC (Sec. 5.4) are used, for example, one
cooperative top tier node v ∈ Ti−1 might already be enough for growing the top tier in a way that is robust and doesn’t
only dilute the relative influence of v . How partially supported top tier changes would play out must be investigated
based on more specific scenarios. We expect the safe "firing" of top tier nodes to be especially challenging.
Which begs the question—can the safety requirement be weakened? For example, given sufficiently good (out-of-
band) coordination between members of Vi−1 \Ti−1, a (Vi ,Qi ) might be instantiated in which at least (Vi \Ti−1,Qi )
enjoys quorum intersection. It is conceivable that novel protocols can be developed, possibly also leveraging the FBAS
structure, that reduce the notorious difficulty of such coordinated bottom-up actions.
7 CONCLUSION
We demonstrate in this paper that, despite the complexity of the FBAS model, the properties of concrete FBAS
instances can be described in a way that is both precise and intuitive, and allows comparisons with more classical
byzantine agreement systems. We propose the notions of minimal blocking sets, minimal splitting sets and top tiers to
describe which groups of nodes can compromise liveness and safety and out which group of "central" nodes they are
drawn. While performing exact analyses involves computational problems of exponential complexity, heuristics and
appropriately engineered algorithms make it possible to analyze a wide range of interesting FBASs. Using an analysis
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framework we specifically developed for this work, we also tackle the question of how individual configurations result
in global properties. We find that overly strategic configuration policies result in FBASs that are indistinguishable
from permissioned systems. Individualistic approaches, on the other hand, cannot guarantee safe results while quickly
resulting in systems that are infeasible to analyze. Adding some strategic decision-making at organically emerging top
tier nodes offers a potential middle way towards robust FBASs instantiated from the sum of individual preferences.
Independently of the way in which a given FBAS came to be, however, the composition of a once established top tier
cannot be influenced without the cooperation of existing top tier nodes, without at the same time threatening safety.
This seems to place the FBAS paradigm closer to the "permissioned consensus" camp than hoped. More investigation is
needed to determine the exact impact of bottom-up top tier changes (as in number of nodes affected by a loss of safety
or liveness, for example) and to formulate possible coordination strategies to keep such impacts low.
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A ADDITIONAL COROLLARIES, THEOREMS AND PROOFS
A.1 Minimal quorums
Corollary 2 (minimal qorum intersection ⇐⇒ qorum intersection). LetU ⊆ 2V be the set of all quorums
of the FBAS (V,Q), Uˆ ⊆ U be the set of all minimal quorums. All pairs ofU1,U2 ∈ U intersect iff all pairs of Uˆ1, Uˆ2 ∈ Uˆ
intersect.
Proof. Since Uˆ ⊆ U, ∀U1,U2 ∈ U : U1 ∩ U2 , ∅ trivially implies that ∀Uˆ1, Uˆ2 ∈ Uˆ : Uˆ1 ∩ Uˆ2 , ∅. The other
direction follows because ∀U1,U2 ∈ U ∃Uˆ1, Uˆ2 ∈ Uˆ : Uˆ1 ⊆ U1 ∧ Uˆ2 ⊆ U2 (Uˆ being the set of all minimal sets w.r.t.U;
s.a. Def. 6). If all pairs in Uˆ intersect, so must therefore all pairs inU. □
This was previously also shown in [11].
A.2 Blocking sets
Corollary 3 (blocking for all =⇒ blocking for all minimal). LetU ⊆ 2V be the set of all quorums of the FBAS
(V,Q), and Uˆ ⊆ U be the set of all minimal quorums. If B is a blocking set forU, then it is also a blocking set for Uˆ.
Proof. B is a blocking set forU ⇐⇒ ∀U ∈ U : B ∩U , ∅ (Def. 5). Uˆ ⊆ U =⇒ ∀Uˆ ∈ Uˆ : B ∩ Uˆ , ∅, so that B
is also a blocking set for Uˆ. □
Corollary 4 (blocking for all minimal =⇒ blocking for all). Let U ⊆ 2V be the set of all quorums of the
FBAS (V,Q), and Uˆ ⊆ U be the set of all minimal quorums. If B is blocking set for Uˆ, then it is also a blocking set forU.
Proof. B is a blocking set for Uˆ =⇒ ∀U ∈ Uˆ : B ∩U , ∅ (Def. 5). Uˆ ⊆ U and all U ∈ Uˆ are minimal w.r.t.U
=⇒ ∀U ∈ U ∃Uˆ ∈ Uˆ : Uˆ ⊆ U (c.f. Def. 6) =⇒ U ∩ B , ∅ =⇒ B is blocking for allU ∈ U. □
Corollary 5 (minimal blocking sets result from minimal qorums). LetU ⊆ 2V be the set of all quorums of the
FBAS (V,Q), Uˆ ⊆ U be the set of all minimal quorums, and Bˆ ⊆ 2V be the set of all minimal blocking sets. Then each
minimal blocking set Bˆ ∈ Bˆ of the FBAS is minimally blocking w.r.t. Uˆ, i.e., Bˆ intersects every minimal quorum Uˆ ∈ Uˆ
and no B′ ⊂ Bˆ intersects every minimal quorum Uˆ ∈ Uˆ.
Proof. Let B ⊆ 2V be the set of all blocking sets w.r.t. Uˆ. Based on Cor. 3 and Cor. 4, B is exactly the set of all
blocking sets forU. Hence the set of all minimal sets w.r.t. B is exactly the set of all minimal blocking sets w.r.t.U and
therefore the set of all minimal blocking sets for (V,Q), or Bˆ ⊆ B. Likewise, as B is the set of all blocking sets w.r.t. Uˆ,
Bˆ is the set of all minimal blocking sets w.r.t. Uˆ. □
A.3 Splitting sets
Corollary 6 (minimal splitting sets result from minimal qorums). LetU ⊆ 2V be the set of all quorums of the
FBAS (V,Q), Uˆ ⊆ U be the set of all minimal quorums, and Sˆ ⊆ 2V be the set of all minimal splitting sets. Then for each
minimal splitting set Sˆ ∈ Sˆ there are two Uˆ1, Uˆ2 ∈ Uˆ such that Sˆ = Uˆ1 ∩ Uˆ2.
Proof. Note first the extreme case that (V,Q) does not enjoy quorum intersection. Then Sˆ = {∅} and, as a
consequence of Cor. 2 there are Uˆ1, Uˆ2 ∈ Uˆ such that Uˆ1 ∩ Uˆ2 = ∅. In the general case, for each Sˆ ∈ Sˆ there are
U1,U2 ∈ U such thatU1 ∩U2 = Sˆ (Def. 7). Let Uˆ1, Uˆ2 ∈ Uˆ such that Uˆ1 ⊆ U1 and Uˆ2 ⊆ U2. Uˆ1 and Uˆ2 must exist as Uˆ is
the set of all minimal sets (Def. 6) w.r.t.U. Let S ′ = Uˆ1 ∩ Uˆ2. S ′ ⊆ Sˆ , because Uˆ1 ⊆ U1 and Uˆ2 ⊆ U2. If S ′ ⊂ Sˆ , Sˆ would
not be a minimal splitting set. Therefore S ′ = Sˆ , i.e., there are Uˆ1, Uˆ2 ∈ Uˆ such that Sˆ = Uˆ1 ∩ Uˆ2. □
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A.4 Top tier
Corollary 7 (minimal blocking sets formed only from top tier nodes). Let T be the top tier of an FBAS (V,Q),
and Bˆ ⊆ 2V be the set of all minimal blocking sets of (V,Q). Then ∀Bˆ ∈ Bˆ : Bˆ ⊆ T .
Proof. As per Cor. 5, all Bˆ ∈ Bˆ result from intersections of minimal quorums Uˆ ∈ Uˆ. As T = ⋃ Uˆ (Def. 8),
∀Bˆ ∈ Bˆ : Bˆ ⊆ T . □
Theorem A.1 (each top tier node in at least one minimal blocking set). Let T be the top tier of an FBAS (V,Q),
and Bˆ ⊆ 2V be the set of all minimal blocking sets of (V,Q). Then for each top tier node v ∈ T there is at least one minimal
blocking set Bˆ ∈ Bˆ such that v ∈ Bˆ.
Proof. Let v ∈ T be an arbitrary top tier node and Uˆ ∈ Uˆ an arbitrary minimal quorum such that v ∈ Uˆ (recall that
T =
⋃ Uˆ as per Def. 8). T \ Uˆ intersects every Uˆ ′ ∈ Uˆ \ {Uˆ }, as otherwise there would be a Uˆ ′ ∈ Uˆ such that Uˆ ′ ⊂ Uˆ
(i.e., Uˆ would not be a minimal quorum). Therefore, T \ Uˆ is a blocking set w.r.t. Uˆ \ {Uˆ } and B′ = {v} ∪T \ Uˆ is a
blocking set w.r.t. Uˆ. B′ \ {v} is not a blocking set w.r.t. Uˆ because it doesn’t intersect Uˆ . Hence, all Bˆ ∈ Bˆ such that
Bˆ ⊆ B′ (and there must be at least one—B′—because B′ is a blocking set w.r.t. Uˆ) must contain v . Hence the FBAS has
at least one minimal blocking set Bˆ ∈ Bˆ that contains v . □
Corollary 8 (minimal splitting sets formed only from top tier nodes). Let T be the top tier of an FBAS (V,Q),
and Sˆ ⊆ 2V be the set of all minimal splitting sets of (V,Q). Then ∀Sˆ ∈ Sˆ : Sˆ ⊆ T .
Proof. As per Cor. 6, all Sˆ ∈ Sˆ result from intersections of minimal quorums Uˆ ∈ Uˆ. As T = ⋃ Uˆ (Def. 8),
∀Sˆ ∈ Sˆ : Sˆ ⊆ T . □
Theorem A.2 (Splitting/blocking sets in symmetric top tier). For an FBAS (V,Q) with a symmetric top tier
T ⊆ V,m := |T | such that ∀v ∈ T : Q(v) = qset(v,T , ∅, t) it holds that:
(1) All minimal blocking sets Bˆ ∈ Bˆ have cardinality max(m − t + 1, 0).
(2) All minimal splitting sets Sˆ ∈ Sˆ have cardinality max(2t −m, 0)
Proof. We observe that for any v ∈ T , Q(v) = {q ⊆ V,v ∈ q ∧ |q ∩T | ≥ t} (Def. 2). A U ⊂ T is therefore a quorum
in (V,Q) iff |U | ≥ t (Def. 3). As allU ⊂ T with |U | ≥ t are quorums in (V,Q), the minimal quorums in (V,Q) are exactly
Uˆ = {Uˆ ⊆ T , |Uˆ | = t}. Then:
ad (1): For all B ⊆ T with |B | = m − t + 1 it holds that ∀U ′ ⊆ T \ B : |U ′ | = t − 1 < t . Hence, no U ′ ⊆ T \ B is a
quorum, there are no quorums that are disjoint with B and B is a blocking set (Def. 5). B is furthermore a minimal
blocking set, as for any B′ ⊂ B it holds thatU = T \ B′ is a quorum (as |U | ≥ t ), and so B′ is not a blocking set.
ad (2): Let Sˆ ∈ Sˆ be an arbitrary minimal splitting set for (V,Q). If 2t −m ≤ 0, there exist two minimal quorums
Uˆ1, Uˆ2 ∈ Uˆ (with cardinality t ) that do not intersect. There is then only one Sˆ = ∅ and the cardinality of all minimal
splitting sets is trivially 0. In the following, we assume that 2t −m > 0 and (V,Q) therefore enjoys quorum intersection.
As per Cor. 6, there are at least two minimal quorums Uˆ1, Uˆ2 ∈ Uˆ such that Sˆ = Uˆ1 ∩ Uˆ2. Let U = Uˆ1 ∪ Uˆ2. N ′ = T \U
must be empty, otherwise we could, with an arbitrary N ′′ ⊆ Sˆ, |N ′′ | = |N ′ | find a minimal quorum Uˆ3 = (Uˆ2 \N ′′)∪N ′
such that Uˆ1 ∩ Uˆ3 ⊂ Sˆ (i.e., Sˆ is not minimal). It therefore holds that U = T and, since, |Uˆ1 | = |Uˆ2 | = t , |Sˆ | = 2t −m. □
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B EXAMPLE ANALYSIS: TOY NETWORKS
For illustrating aspects of our proposed analysis approach, we will now present and discuss two simple example FBASs.
We will use integers to represent distinct nodes, so that V = {0, 1, 2, 3} implies a node population consisting of the nodes
0 to 3. We will first completely (and manually) analyse a 5-node FBAS based on the metrics and approach discussed in
Sec. 4 (also with the help of corollaries from Appendix A). We will then discuss the phenomenon of cascading failures
(observed in Sec. 5.4) based on a suitable 7-node FBAS.
B.1 Almost-partitioned FBAS
Consider the FBAS (V,Q) with V = {0, 1, 2, 3} and Q such that:
Q(0) = qset(0, {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}, ∅, 3)
Q(1) = qset(1, {0, 1, 2}, ∅, 3)
Q(2) = qset(2, {0, 1, 2}, ∅, 3)
Q(3) = qset(3, {0, 3, 4}, ∅, 3)
Q(4) = qset(4, {0, 3, 4}, ∅, 3)
This Q can be the result of a scenario in which all v ∈ V apply the QSC policy All Neighbors QSC (Sec. 5.3) based on
following graph G:
0
1
2
3
4
B.1.1 Minimal quorums. As (V,Q) is a small FBAS, we can simply brute-force the set of all quorumsU ⊆ 2V bymanually
checking, for eachU ⊆ V, whetherU is a quorum (Def. 3) based on Q. We can see that one subset of cardinality 5 is a
quorum—{0, 1, 2, 3, 4}, no subsets of cardinality 4 are quorums, two subsets of cardinality 3 are quorums—{0, 1, 2} and
{0, 3, 4}, and no subsets of cardinalities lower than 3 can be quorums. We arrive atU = {{0, 1, 2}, {0, 3, 4}, {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}}.
U , ∅, therefore (V,Q) enjoys quorum availability, a critical precondition for liveness (c.f. Sec. 3.2). Filtering out all
non-minimal quorums, we arrive at the set of all minimal quorums Uˆ = {{0, 1, 2}, {0, 3, 4}}. Uˆ , ∅ and all Uˆ1, Uˆ2 ∈ Uˆ
intersect, therefore (V,Q) enjoys quorum intersection (as per Cor. 2), a critical precondition for safety (c.f. Sec. 3.3).
Notably, the top tier of (V,Q) is T = V (c.f. Def. 8).
B.1.2 Minimal blocking sets. Based on Cor. 5, we only need to look at Uˆ for determining the set of minimal blocking
sets Bˆ of the FBAS (cf. Sec. 4.1). Using brute-force search and subsequent filtering, or through taking a sharp look, we
can see that Bˆ = {{0}, {1, 3}, {1, 4}, {2, 3}, {2, 4}}. A failure of any of these sets is sufficient for compromising quorum
availability and therefore liveness. Note that the FBAS is therefore very brittle: a failure of node 0 alone is already
sufficient to compromise liveness.
B.1.3 Minimal splitting sets. Based on Cor. 6, we only need to look at Uˆ for determining the set of minimal splitting sets
Sˆ of the FBAS (cf. Sec. 4.2). Since |Uˆ | = 2, there is only one intersection between minimal quorums—{0, 1, 2}∩{0, 3, 4} =
{0}. Consequently, Sˆ = {{0}}. Control over any minimal splitting set is sufficient for compromising quorum intersection
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and therefore safety. Node 0 is therefore not only indispensable for liveness but also in a position to, by-itself, compromise
safety. Even though all nodes in V are part of the top tier, node 0 plays an especially "central" role in (V,Q).
B.2 Cascading failures
Consider the FBAS (V,Q) with V = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and Q such that:
Q(0) = qset(0, {0, 1, 2}, ∅, 3)
Q(1) = qset(1, {0, 1, 2, 3}, ∅, 3)
Q(2) = qset(2, {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, ∅, 5)
Q(3) = qset(3, {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, ∅, 5)
Q(4) = qset(4, {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, ∅, 5)
Q(5) = qset(5, {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, ∅, 5)
Q(6) = qset(6, {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, ∅, 5)
This Q can be the result of a scenario in which all v ∈ V apply the QSC policy All Neighbors QSC (Sec. 5.3) based on
following graph G (unidirectional edges highlighted as dashed lines):
0
1
2
3
45
6
We find the minimal blocking sets Bˆ ⊂ 2V of (V,Q) using our analysis tool (c.f. Sec. 4.4):
Bˆ = {{2}, {1, 3}, {1, 4}, {1, 5}, {1, 6}, {0, 3}, {3, 4, 5}, {3, 4, 6}, {3, 5, 6}, {0, 4, 5}, {0, 4, 6}, {0, 5, 6}, {4, 5, 6}}
Despite the fact that most nodes in V have very "robust" quorum sets—being able to tolerate up to f = 2 failures,
which corresponds to a minimal blocking set of cardinality 3—the smallest blocking set in (V,Q), {2}, actually has
cardinality 1. Consider a failure of node 2. Node 0’s quorum set (Q(0)) is not satisfiable anymore, so that 0 de-facto fails
as well. With both 0 and 2 failed, node 1, being able to tolerate only f = 1 failures, becomes unsatisfiable as well. With
three nodes having de-facto failed, none of the remaining nodes’ quorum sets can be satisfied anymore, so that (V,Q)
loses quorum availability. Enabled through the "weak" quorum sets of nodes 0 and 1, the failure of 2 triggers what we
would call a cascading failure. Apparently the liveness "buffer" of an FBAS, as represented by its smallest blocking sets,
is often heavily influenced by the most easily dissatisfied nodes in its top tier.
Notably, we don’t see a similar effect with regards to minimal splitting sets. In the present example, there are fewer
minimal splitting sets Sˆ ⊂ 2V than in an "ideal" FBAS of the same size (c.f. Ideal Open QSC in Sec. 5.2) but they all have
the same "ideal" cardinality 3:
Sˆ = {{0, 1, 2}, {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 2, 5}, {1, 2, 6}, {2, 3, 4}, {2, 3, 5}, {2, 3, 6}, {2, 4, 5}, {2, 4, 6}, {2, 5, 6}}
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C EXAMPLE ANALYSIS: STELLAR NETWORK
As an example for the results obtainable using the proposed methodology and tooling (cf. Sec. 4), we will now present a
short study into the Stellar FBAS [12]. We obtained different snapshots of the Stellar FBAS in JSON format, from the
popular monitoring website Stellarbeat6. From the same source, we also obtain data for allocating nodes, here individual
network hosts running the Stellar software, to the organizations they belong to. We use this data to merge nodes
belonging to the same organization, so that nodes in the subsequent discussion can represent distinct organizations as
in the remainder of this paper. We merge nodes in this way after finding all minimal quorum sets, so that we do not
need to alter any quorum sets for maintaining correctness. Before finding all minimal quorum sets, we furthermore
filter out all nodes with obviously broken configurations, for example nodes v ∈ V with Q(v) = ∅ or Q(v) = {v}.
|min. block. set| |min. split. set| |top tier|
0
1
(a) 2018
|min. block. set| |min. split. set| |top tier|
0
2
4
(b) August 2019 – October 2019
|min. block. set| |min. split. set| |top tier|
0
2
4
6
(c) November 2019 – January 2020
|min. block. set| |min. split. set| |top tier|
0
2
4
6
(d) 4 February 2020
Fig. 4. Analysis results for snapshots of the Stellar network (using data from https://stellarbeat.io).
Results for a selection of snapshots available to us are presented in Fig. 4. For each presented FBAS snapshot, the
plots chart the size of its top tier as well as the average cardinalities of minimal blocking and minimal splitting sets, with
error bars marking the cardinalities of the smallest and largest respective set. It can be seen that the top tier is slowly
growing through time (in 2018, it consisted of only the Stellar Development Foundation), reaching 7 organizations at
the time of writing. With the exception of the most recent depicted snapshot from 4 February 2020, the top tiers in all
presented snapshots are symmetric, as can also be inferred from the identical cardinalities of, respectively, minimal
blocking sets and minimal splitting sets. Notably, the top tier as of 6 February 2020 (not depicted) is already symmetric
(with all relevant minimal sets having cardinality 3). This adaptation suggests that top tier nodes might be reacting to
each others’ decisions and actively strive towards a symmetric configuration, as proposed in Sec. 5.4. Furthermore, the
thresholds of top tier quorum sets appear to be chosen based on the 67 % logic, as do all policies we propose in Sec. 5.
6 https://www.stellarbeat.io/; Data from Stellarbeat was also used in previous academic studies such as [10].
